After the Override: An Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent by Widiss, Deborah A. & Broughman, Brian J
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2017
After the Override: An Empirical Analysis of
Shadow Precedent
Deborah A. Widiss
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dwidiss@indiana.edu
Brian J. Broughman
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, bbroughm@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation




[ Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 46 (January 2017)]
© 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/2017/4601-0002$10.00
After the Override: An Empirical Analysis of 
Shadow Precedent
Brian J. Broughman and Deborah A. Widiss
ABSTRACT
Congressional overrides of prior judicial interpretations of statutory language are typically de-
fined as equivalent to judicial overrulings, and they are presumed to play a central role in 
maintaining legislative supremacy. Our study is the first to empirically test these assumptions. 
Using a differences-in-differences research design, we find that citation levels decrease far less 
after legislative overrides than after judicial overrulings. This pattern holds true even when 
controlling for depth of the superseding event or considering only the specific proposition 
that was superseded. Moreover, contrary to what one might expect, citation levels decrease 
more quickly after restorative overrides—in which Congress repudiates the prior Supreme Court 
decision as incorrect—than after overrides intended to update or clarify the law. This sug-
gests that ongoing citation of overridden precedents, what we call shadow precedents, may be 
driven more by information failure or ambiguity than by ideological disagreements between the 
branches of government.
1. INTRODUCTION
The ability of Congress to override judicial interpretations of statutes is 
central to theories of the separation of powers. While the Constitution 
formally places all law-making authority in Congress, judicial decisions 
informally shape legislation by filling in gaps and resolving ambiguity. 
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Legislative supremacy thus depends on the assumption that, if Congress 
disagrees with a judicial interpretation of a law, it may override that in-
terpretation by passing a new statute or amending an existing statute 
(Barnes 2004; Eskridge 1994; Levi 1949).
Accordingly, legislative overrides play a large role in both political sci-
ence and legal scholarship. Positive political theorists contend that over-
rides constrain the Supreme Court’s ability to follow its own ideological 
preferences (Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Gely and Spiller 1990; Ber-
gara, Richman, and Spiller 2003; Bailey and Maltzman 2011), whereas 
legal theorists more typically present overrides as helpful corrections from 
Congress (for example, Eskridge 1994; Elhauge 2002; Marshall 1989). 
But both accounts depend on two conditions being satisfied (Widiss 
2009). First, Congress must monitor statutory interpretation decisions 
and respond to decisions with which it disagrees. Empirical studies show 
that Congress, while limited by gridlock in recent years (Hasen 2013), 
does regularly enact overrides (Eskridge 1991a; Klerman 2007; Staudt, 
Lindstädt, and O’Connor 2007; Hasen 2013; Christiansen and Eskridge 
2014). Second, congressional overrides must have some bite—they must 
supersede the prior judicial interpretation. This is generally assumed but 
not addressed. Ours is the first empirical study to measure the extent to 
which an override changes citation patterns to the overridden case.1
A congressional override is typically defined as the legislative equiva-
lent of judicial overruling. However, on the ground for the lower courts 
that must first interpret the significance of a change in the law, they are 
quite different. If a decision has been overruled by a higher court, it is 
clear to lower courts that they should follow the signals of that higher 
court. In addition, in most instances, such changes are immediately 
flagged by legal research tools like Westlaw and LexisNexis. By contrast, 
it often takes several years for Westlaw and LexisNexis to indicate that a 
new statutory provision affects the validity of a precedent (Widiss 2014; 
Christiansen and Eskridge 2014). Even if aware of the override, lower 
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courts must determine the extent to which the new statutory language 
super sedes the rule established by the precedent. Faced with competing 
signals from Congress and the Supreme Court, a lower-court judge may 
be apt to continue to follow the superseded precedent, at least on any 
point where it is at all unclear whether it remains controlling. This could 
be the result of a generalized deference to higher courts or a preference 
for reducing the risk of reversal by deciding cases in line with the Su-
preme Court’s presumed preferences. The ambiguity implicit in inter-
preting overrides also might offer lower-court judges the opportunity to 
advance their own ideological preferences. As a result, even after Con-
gress passes an override, the precedent may live on as what we call a 
shadow precedent. Earlier qualitative work identifies numerous examples 
of courts following shadow precedents in employment discrimination de-
cisions (Widiss 2009, 2012, 2015). This project examines the extent to 
which this is a more general phenomenon.
The theory of shadow precedent predicts that, everything else equal, 
an overridden case is more likely than an overruled case to be treated as 
valid precedent after the superseding event. To investigate this question, 
we put together an original database of judicial citations to three differ-
ent groups of Supreme Court decisions: cases overridden by Congress (n 
= 166), cases subsequently overruled by the Court itself (n = 55), and a 
matched control group, created using coarsened exact matching (CEM) 
(Blackwell et al. 2009), of Supreme Court decisions that were neither 
overridden nor overruled (n = 141). For each case in our data set, we 
record the number of annual citations to the case, sorted by Shepard’s 
signal, for a 16-year period, starting 5 years prior to the event (override 
or overruling) and continuing until 10 years after the event. We use a 
differences-in-differences research design with a matched control group 
to compare how the case was cited before and after the override or over-
ruling.
Both the overruled cases and the overridden cases receive more neg-
ative citations postevent than the control group. However, there are im-
portant differences. For judicially overruled cases, the negative citations 
quickly become more common than positive citations, and the total num-
ber of citations falls dramatically. By contrast, for legislatively overridden 
cases, the number of positive citations and the overall number of citations 
show little change. Even 10 years after an override has been enacted, 
most overridden precedents are still widely cited as controlling law.
To provide a more nuanced comparison, we assess the depth of the 
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superseding event (that is, how fully the override or overruling departed 
from the precedent). We find that for both groups of cases, depth of the 
superseding event is associated with fewer postevent citations, but at 
 every level of depth, citations to cases overruled by a judicial opinion 
decline more than citations to cases overridden by Congress. We find sim-
ilar results when we consider the explicitness with which the Court or 
Congress expressed intent to supersede a prior decision. For a randomly 
selected subset of overridden and overruled cases, we conduct more 
fine-grained analysis by using Lexis-Nexis headnotes to isolate the legal 
proposition directly affected by the superseding event and compare them 
to unrelated headnotes for the same case. We find that for both sets of 
cases, directly superseded headnotes receive significantly fewer citations 
than unrelated headnotes, but the decline is more substantial for over-
ruled cases. And finally, we find that the number of citations drops more 
quickly after restorative overrides—which repudiate the prior judicial 
decision as contrary to congressional intent (Christiansen and Eskridge 
2014)—than after overrides that are intended to update or clarify a law. 
This suggests that ongoing citation of overridden cases may be driven pri-
marily by information failure or ambiguity rather than ideological fights 
between the branches of government.
In sum, on average, looking at specific superseded headnotes and us-
ing regression analysis to control for relevant factors such as depth and 
explicitness, we find that the precedential value of a superseded case dissi-
pates far more quickly and completely after a judicial overruling than af-
ter a congressional override. Our findings are robust to alternative econo-
metric specifications. We control for numerous considerations that may 
affect postevent citations, including ideology, characteristics of cases and 
overrides, and the inclusion of year and case fixed effects. We include 
subsample analysis showing that our results also apply to alternative 
measures of precedent, different event windows, and a balanced panel. 
While legislative overrides and judicial overrulings are not exogenous 
events, our use of case fixed effects, inclusion of a matched control group, 
and separate analysis of headnotes reduces concerns associated with un-
observed effects.
Our findings are consistent with the theory of shadow precedent: leg-
islatively overridden cases are more likely to continue to be cited than 
judicially overruled cases. This is contrary to the conventional view that 
overrides are functionally equivalent to overrulings. Our results further 
suggest that information failure and ambiguity are likely causes of this 
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ongoing reliance on overridden precedents and that these factors are 
more important than ideological differences between the Court and Con-
gress. However, additional empirical research and theoretical refinement 
may be necessary to fully explain the differences we observe in citation 
patterns between overridden and overruled cases. That said, our core em-
pirical result is noteworthy in itself, regardless of the reason for the diver-
gent citation patterns, as it suggests a need to rethink theories of statutory 
interpretation that rely on congressional overrides to redirect judicial in-
terpretations. In short, our findings suggest that overrides are not fully 
serving the role they are expected to play in ensuring legislative suprem-
acy. This is particularly important for overrides that are intended to up-
date or clarify statutory law—and that are often enacted by Congress in 
response to judicial invitation—but for which we find almost no effect on 
the level of citations to the preexisting case.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the 
background literature on precedent and legislative overrides and devel-
ops testable predictions. Section 3 describes our data, Section 4 tests the 
shadow- precedent theory using fixed-effects regression analysis and in-
cludes a number of robustness checks, and Section 5 discusses the impli-
cations of our research and concludes.
2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND THEORY
This section begins with an overview of existing research discussing the 
extent to which precedent and overrides are potential constraints on judi-
cial behavior. After an override, these constraints are in tension with each 
other: the precedent will pull in one direction, and the text of the override 
will pull in another. Lower courts are caught in the middle, as they are 
asked to resolve this tension with little guidance from Congress or the 
Court. We end this section with testable predictions regarding the effect 
of overrides on precedents.
2.1. Background Literature
Adherence to precedent is a central foundation of the American judi-
cial system. In general, courts are expected to decide relevantly similar 
cases consistently, which promotes efficiency, fairness, and predictability 
(Lindquist and Cross 2005; Schauer 1987). Some empirical studies of Su-
preme Court decisions find that ideological preferences play a large role 
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in decisions and that precedent, by contrast, offers comparatively little 
constraint (for example, Segal and Spaeth 2002), whereas other studies 
find that precedent matters in a variety of contexts (for example, Bailey 
and Maltzman 2011; Richards and Kritzer 2002; Hansford and Spriggs 
2006). These findings are likely shaped in part by docket selection; the 
Supreme Court generally takes cases for which there has been a circuit 
split and thus for which, almost by definition, existing precedent does not 
clearly establish the proper outcome (Cross 1997).
Research on decisions by lower-court judges tells a somewhat dif-
ferent story. Both district court and circuit court judges generally com-
ply with Supreme Court precedent that is clearly on point (for example, 
Kim 2007; Klein 2002; Songer and Sheehan 1990). Where application 
of a precedent is unclear, however, studies suggest that judges’ own ide-
ology (Boyd and Spriggs 2009; Sunstein et al. 2006), their network of 
peer judges (Choi and Gulati 2008; Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2012), 
the composition of the panel with whom they sit (Sunstein et al. 2006; 
Kim 2009), the presumed ideological preferences of reviewing courts 
( Randazzo 2008; Westerland et al. 2010), and changes in personnel on 
the Supreme Court (Benjamin and Vanberg 2016) all may play a role. 
There has been relatively little research into how lower courts implement 
Supreme Court decisions that overrule earlier decisions. Benesh and Red-
dick (2002) find that lower courts respond quickly to such changes in the 
law,2 whereas Tokson (2015), which considers changes initiated by the 
Supreme Court and statutory changes, finds that lower courts sometimes 
fail to adopt fully the new doctrine, particularly if the new regime is diffi-
cult to apply or replaces a rule with a standard. Our study adds not only 
to the understanding of the effects of an override but also to this litera-
ture on the effects of a judicial overruling.
In the realm of statutory interpretation, the possibility of  congressional 
override is typically presented as a significant additional limitation on 
courts. Positive political science models often posit that the Supreme 
Court will interpret a statute in a manner that is as close to its ideological 
preferences as possible without triggering a legislative override of the de-
cision (for example, Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Gely and Spiller 1990; 
Eskridge 1991b). Empirical studies are mixed, with some finding evidence 
that the Court, at least in some instances, is constrained by the possibil-
2. This accords with studies that find lower courts to be responsive to significant 
changes in the doctrine governing particular areas of law (for example, Luse et al. 2009; 
Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994).
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ity of an override (Spiller and Gely 1992; Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 
2003; Bailey and Maltzman 2011; Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall 2011) 
and others finding that the Court generally rules according to its ideo-
logical preferences, without adjusting its behavior to avoid a response 
from Congress (Segal 1997). Traditional legal theory, by contrast, typi-
cally conceives of overrides as part of a conversation between the courts 
and Congress, in which courts interpret statutes in line with established 
legal principles and welcome corrections by Congress if they misunder-
stand congressional intent or if the policy needs to be updated (for exam-
ple, Marshall 1989; Levi 1949). The Supreme Court also frequently an-
nounces this understanding of the role of overrides (for example, Flood v. 
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 [1972]), and it regularly invites Congress to override 
decisions (Christiansen and Eskridge 2014).
These legal and positive political theories, as well as the rationales es-
poused in Supreme Court doctrine, depend on two assumptions: (1) that 
Congress monitors judicial opinions and enacts overrides when necessary 
to correct or update statutory policy and (2) that enactment of an over-
ride will change subsequent judicial behavior.3
Several studies examine the validity of this first proposition by seek-
ing to catalog all statutory provisions that supersede prior statutory in-
terpretation decisions by the courts. This work establishes that overrides 
are fairly common; they occur in virtually all areas of federal statutory 
law, but they are especially prevalent in federal procedure, civil rights, 
tax, criminal, and bankruptcy (Eskridge 1991a; Hausegger and Baum 
1998; Staudt, Lindstädt, and O’Connor 2007; Hasen 2013; Christiansen 
and Eskridge 2014; Buatti and Hasen 2015; Christiansen, Eskridge, and 
Thypin-Bermeo 2015).4
There has been very little consideration, however, of the second ques-
tion: what happens after an override? In other words, are overrides effec-
tive in changing the law as applied on the ground? This poses two distinct 
3. This second assumption is often only implicit, but positive political science models 
positing that overrides serve as a constraint on judicial interpretation obviously assume 
that enactment of an override would curtail subsequent judicial interpretation. Similarly, 
the conversation between the judiciary and Congress that legal scholars imagine would be 
ineffective if Congress’s half of the conversation goes unheeded.
4. Within this literature, there is disagreement as to whether overrides should be de-
fined to include all statutory provisions that modify the result in prior statutory interpre-
tation decisions (Christiansen and Eskridge 2014; Christiansen, Eskridge, and Thypin- 
Bermeo 2015) or whether the category should be limited to conscious overrides (Hasen 
2013; Buatti and Hasen 2015). We discuss these definitional issues and how they affect 
our study below and in the online appendix.
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questions. The first is how override statutes are interpreted; the second is 
how the enactment of an override changes reliance on overridden cases. 
To our knowledge, there have been two quantitative studies—Barnes 
(2004) and Christiansen and Eskridge (2014)—that explore aspects of 
how courts interpret override statutes but none that addresses the effect 
of an override on precedent.
Ours is the first large-scale quantitative study of how enactment of 
an override changes reliance on the overridden case—or what we term a 
shadow precedent. While it may seem counterintuitive that courts would 
cite overridden precedents at all, earlier qualitative work provides ex-
amples of this phenomenon in the employment discrimination context. 
Widiss (2009) shows that courts sometimes continue to follow the ratio-
nale or reasoning supporting a holding that has been superseded, on the 
grounds that the override statute addresses only an application of that 
reasoning.5 Widiss (2012) documents lower courts’ confusion when Con-
gress enacts an override but does not amend the other statutes with sim-
ilar language that have typically been interpreted consistently.6 In the ex-
5. For example, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert (429 U.S. 125 [1976]), the Supreme 
Court held that the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex found in Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, 
reasoning that the policy at issue distinguished between “pregnant women and nonpreg-
nant persons” rather than between men and women. Two dissenting opinions argued 
that pregnancy discrimination was inherently a form of sex discrimination, since only 
women become pregnant. Congress quickly superseded Gilbert by enacting the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, which amended Title VII to define sex as including but not 
limited to “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” (Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 
Stat. 2076). In more recent years, women have alleged that denial of access to contracep-
tives or discrimination because of lactation are forms of discrimination because of sex. 
Because these contexts (arguably) are not directly addressed by the language of the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, some lower courts have followed Gilbert as controlling prece-
dent (see, for example, Martinez v. NBC, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 [SDNY 1999]), while 
others have followed the reasoning from the dissent in Gilbert (see, for example, Erickson 
v. Bartrell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 [W.D. Wash. 2001]). In recent years, 
several courts have held that lactation is encompassed within the “related medical condi-
tion” provision of the statutory language (see, for example, EEOC v. Houston Funding 
II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425 [5th Cir. 2013]).
6. This has been widely litigated in the context of the standard for causation under 
various employment discrimination statutes. In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to supersede a prior Supreme Court decision (Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 [1989]) regarding the causation standard that governs claims 
of discrimination under Title VII. Congress did not, however, amend other employment 
discrimination statutes, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, or a distinct part of Title VII, even though all of these contexts 
had typically been interpreted consistently. Lower courts divided over what causation 
standard should apply to these other contexts (Widiss 2009). In Gross v. FBL Financial 
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amples above, courts and commentators could reasonably disagree with 
the propriety of continuing to follow the overridden precedent. Widiss 
(2015) shows that courts also sometimes simply make mistakes, applying 
statutory standards that have unquestionably been superseded.7 Whether 
because of disagreement over the scope of an override, ideological pref-
erences, confusion, ignorance, or simply resistance to change (compare 
Tokson 2015), overridden precedents remain influential.
2.2. Shadow Precedent: Theory and Predictions
Both judicial overrulings and legislative overrides are intended to super-
sede, at least in part, the rule established in a prior decision. It is com-
mon, in fact, to define overrides as the legislative equivalent of overruling. 
However, there are differences between overrulings and overrides that 
suggest that overrides may be less effective than overrulings at changing 
citation patterns to the precedent.
As a preliminary matter, after either an overruling or an override, 
courts must recognize that something has occurred that could affect prec-
edential value of the prior case. Courts and lawyers rely heavily on West-
law, LexisNexis, and other legal research services to flag when subse-
quent developments affect the reliability of a precedent, either positively 
or negatively. As described in Widiss (2014), the legal research services 
have adopted coding protocols that look almost exclusively to judicial 
signals. Thus, when the Supreme Court explicitly overrules a prior Su-
preme Court decision, both Westlaw and Lexis immediately “red flag” 
the prior decision. By contrast, a case generally will not be identified as 
superseded by a statute until a court issues a decision that makes this con-
nection; consequently, there is often a multiyear lag before legal research 
Services (557 U.S. 167 [2009]) and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center 
v. Nassar (133 S. Ct. 2517 [2013]), the Supreme Court instructed lower courts that the 
causation standard specified by the override should not be applied in these other contexts.
7. Widiss (2015) illustrates this phenomenon by looking at the implementation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) (Pub. L. No. 110-
325), an unusually strong and clear override. The ADAAA includes statutory purposes 
clauses that explicitly reject the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act as counter to Congress’s original intent; the ADAAA also amended 
the substantive language of the Americans with Disabilities Act to supersede the Court’s 
prior interpretations. Nonetheless, as documented in Widiss (2015), lower courts regu-
larly continue to cite the overridden precedents as controlling law. Some of these lower- 
court decisions make no mention of the ADAAA; others acknowledge that the ADAAA 
was enacted but fail to recognize that the new statutory language unquestionably super-
sedes relevant portions of the precedent.
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services recognize an override (Widiss 2014). These lag times suggest that 
information failure may contribute to ongoing reliance on overridden 
precedents.
Once aware of the superseding event, lower courts must determine 
how it affects the precedential value of the prior decision. Again, with ju-
dicial overrulings, this is usually relatively straightforward in that a court 
needs only to parse the overruling decision. After an override, the analysis 
is often more complex: lower courts must determine the extent to which 
the new statutory language supersedes the precedent, which otherwise 
remains binding on lower courts. In resolving this tension, lower-court 
judges might lean toward following the precedent, at least when it is am-
biguous which should control. This could be for abstract rule-of-law rea-
sons or for more instrumental reasons. That is, for a trial court judge, 
the possibility of review and potential reversal by an appellate court or 
the Supreme Court (the source of the precedent and the judge’s superiors 
in the judicial hierarchy) is likely to be of more immediate concern than 
any hypothetical feedback from a future Congress (the source of the over-
ride). It is also possible that courts use the ambiguity implicit in overrides 
to advance their own ideological preferences. For these reasons, as well 
as potential information failure as discussed above, the theory of shadow 
precedent predicts that, everything else being equal, an overridden case is 
more likely than an overruled case to be cited as valid precedent after the 
respective event (the shadow-precedent hypothesis).
We use distinctions between restorative and nonrestorative overrides, 
as classified by Christiansen and Eskridge (2014), to assess further the 
factors that may drive ongoing citation of overridden precedents. Restor-
ative overrides, defined as overrides that repudiate a prior judicial deci-
sion as contrary to congressional intent, tend to be very explicit, and the 
fight between Congress and the Court often receives significant coverage 
in the legal and popular presses. By contrast, nonrestorative overrides 
that update or clarify the law, like major revisions of bankruptcy law 
or the tax code, can be quite deep—in that they wholly replace one or 
several precedents—but they are less likely to denigrate, or even identify, 
the precedents affected. If ongoing reliance on shadow precedents stems 
primarily from information failure or from the failure of Congress to give 
clear signals, precedent superseded by a restorative override will be less 
likely to be cited positively after an override than precedent superseded 
by a nonrestorative override.
On the other hand, restorative overrides occur more frequently in 
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 areas of the law where there are sharp partisan divides. In addition, the 
fact that Congress is so clearly disagreeing with the Court could increase 
the likelihood that lower courts would feel pressure to interpret an over-
ride as narrowly as possible, in that they can reasonably predict that a 
majority of the Supreme Court would prefer a different interpretation 
than that which Congress has enacted. To the extent that lower courts’ 
compliance with the assumed preferences of the Supreme Court drives 
ongoing citations to shadow precedents, precedent superseded by a non-
restorative override would be less likely to be cited positively than prece-
dent superseded by a restorative override.
3. DATA
To investigate these questions, we constructed a database of citations to 
Supreme Court decisions. Citation counts are a common mechanism to 
gauge the precedential importance of a case (see, for example, Black and 
Spriggs 2013; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Westerland et al. 2010). Our 
database includes annual citations to 166 statutory interpretation cases 
subsequently overridden by Congress, 55 cases subsequently overruled by 
the Court, and a matched control group of 141 Supreme Court decisions 
that were neither overridden nor overruled.8
For the sample of cases that were overridden (hereafter, the overrid-
den sample), we collect data for all cases (decided after 1946)9 identified 
by Christiansen and Eskridge (2014) as being subject to legislative over-
rides enacted between 1985 and 2011 (n = 166). The definition of an 
override in Christiansen and Eskridge (2014)—any statutory provision 
that modifies the result in a prior statutory interpretation decision—is 
broader than in Buatti and Hasen (2015), which includes only conscious 
overrides (where the legislative history or statutory language makes clear 
that Congress was responding to a judicial decision). We use the former 
definition because, under standard legal principles, applicable statutory 
language should govern resolution of cases, whether or not the interac-
tion of that statutory language with a precedent was clearly identified in 
legislative history. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the consciousness 
8. See our online data files. The online appendix includes STATA code for replicating 
the regression results included in the tables.
9. This limitation comes from the fact that we gather background data on the cases 
from the Supreme Court Database, which includes all Supreme Court decisions after 1946 
(see Washington University Law, The Supreme Court Database [http://scdb.wustl.edu]).
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of congressional action may affect how precedent is cited, and thus we 
include Conscious as an explanatory variable in the analysis below.
To compile the sample of cases that were overruled (hereafter, the 
overruled sample), we use Brenner and Spaeth (1995) and the Supreme 
Court Database (SCD) to identify cases (decided after 1946) that were 
overruled between 1985 and 2011 (n = 55). It would be ideal to compare 
only statutory interpretation cases within the two categories. However, 
because it is relatively uncommon for the Court to overrule prior stat-
utory decisions, our list of overruled cases also includes constitutional 
decisions.
Finally, we use CEM (Blackwell et al. 2009) to construct a contempo-
raneous control group of decisions that were neither overridden nor over-
ruled. In CEM, a variant of exact matching, the data are first coarsened 
into categories defined by the researcher and then exact matched using 
the coarsened data. This process improves “estimation of causal effects 
by reducing imbalance in covariates between treated and control groups” 
(Blackwell et al. 2009, p. 524). Using data available in the SCD, treat-
ment group cases are matched on the basis of six observed characteris-
tics: year of the decision (coarsened by 2 years), ideological direction (lib-
eral or conservative), area of law (divided into 21 categories), type of law 
(statutory, constitutional, or other, such as court rules or diversity cases), 
type of decision (signed opinions, judgments [plurality opinions], or per 
curium opinions), and number of votes for the majority opinion.10 We 
found a 1 : 1 match for 102 cases from the overridden group and 39 cases 
from the overruled group, which gives us a total of 141 matched control 
group cases. Because our matched control group covers the same time 
period, general subject area, and ideology as the two treatment groups, it 
can help us isolate the effect of treatment as opposed to unobserved de-
velopments occurring within our event window.
For each case in our sample, we collected the number of annual ci-
tations and associated Shepard’s signals for the 16-year period starting 
5 years prior to the event and continuing until 10 years after the event. 
Going back 5 years prior to the event gives us a solid baseline of how each 
case is cited before the legislative override or judicial overruling. Because 
overrides are not retroactively implemented, we use a longer postevent 
period—10 years—to capture the full impact of the superseding event. 
We treat this 16-year period as an event window indexed by t, from t = 
10. Majority votes are divided into three categories: four or five votes, six or seven 
votes, and eight or nine votes.
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-5 to t = 10 and with the event (override or overruling) centered at t = 
0. This effectively gives us panel data with up to 16 observations per case, 
with the case-year pair as the relevant unit of analysis.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. All of the overrides and overrul-
ings occurred between 1985 and 2011; the average year for both groups 
was approximately 1995. The average age of the cases that were super-
seded by these events, by contrast, varies, with the mean case in the over-
ridden group decided in 1986, and the mean case in the overruled case 
decided in 1973. Relatedly, the average amount of time from decision un-
til override (8.4 years) is much shorter than from decision until overrul-
ing (22.6 years). This reflects a difference between overrides and overrul-
ings. The Court will not typically overrule its own precedents unless there 
has been some significant intervening development that can plausibly jus-
tify abandoning stare decisis principles. By contrast, Congress often acts 
very quickly to supersede judicial decisions with which it disagrees; 27 
percent of the cases in our overridden group were superseded less than 
2 years after the decision.11 Our use of the control group, which matches 
the age of cases in the overruled and overridden groups, helps us dis-
tinguish changes in citation levels that are responsive to the superseding 
event from the more general depreciation—that is, gradual decline in ci-
tations—that affects all precedents (see, for example, Landes and Posner 
1976; Merryman 1954; Black and Spriggs 2013).
We use the SCD’s classifications of cases as liberal or conservative as a 
rough gauge of the ideological directions of the decisions. A significantly 
higher percentage of cases in the overruled group are classified as liberal 
decisions (65 percent) than in the overridden group (43 percent), which 
reflects the changing composition of the Court and Congress over this 
period.
Table 1 also reports the average number of citations that each case re-
ceived per year. On average, we were able to collect 13.7 years of citation 
data for cases in the overridden sample, 14.5 years for cases in the over-
ruled sample, and 14.2 years for cases in the control group. For all three 
groups, the mean number of annual citations to each case is substantially 
11. This results in an unbalanced panel, with pre-event observations for some over-
ridden cases truncated by the amount of time between the decision and the superseding 
event; a shorter window, however, may result in a less accurate baseline measure for pre-
event citations. In Section 4.3, we explore the robustness of our analysis using a balanced 
panel.
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greater than the median, which reflects outlier cases in each group.12 Ac-
cording to medians, a typical case from the overridden and the overruled 
groups receives a similar number of annual citations (25.7 and 22.1, re-
spectively), while the matched control group case receives fewer (12.1).
Using Shepard’s signal indicators, we measure net citations to each 
case in year t as
 
Net Citations Positive Neutral Cited By)
(Warning Cautio
t = + +
+-
(
n Questioned).+  
The most common Shepard’s signal is “cited by.” Signals indicating more 
extensive discussion, such as positive treatment or warning, are compara-
tively rare. We include cited-by signals in our calculation of net citations 
since even such neutral signals indicate that later courts cited the prior 
case as presumptively valid precedent. However, as described below, we 
test the robustness of our results against alternative methods of citation 
counting that give more weight to small fluctuations in negative citations 
and a variation of this measure that excludes neutral and cited-by cites 
entirely.
Our primary interest is not in the absolute (or even net) number of 
citations that a case receives per year but rather the change in the num-
ber of citations that accompanied the event. Did net citations decline fol-
lowing the event, and if so how big was the change? To provide a rough 
case-level measure of this, we assign each case a shadow-precedent score, 
defined as
Shadow-Precedent Score
Average net citations per year in the poste= vent period
Average net citations per year in the pre-event period
,
where the pre-event period is from year t = -5 to year t = -1 and the 
postevent period is from year t = 3 to year t = 10. We exclude years 
immediately following the passage of the override or the overruling (t 
= 0, 1, and 2); this is because overrides are generally prospective only, 
and thus claims litigated during this period may still be adjudicated under 
12. For example, the overruled group includes Conley v. Gibson (355 U.S. 41 [1957]), 
which is cited extremely frequently because it addresses the standard for a motion to dis-
miss, and the overridden group includes several habeas corpus cases commonly referenced 
in (the voluminous body of) prisoner litigation. In the regression analysis below, our de-
pendent variable is defined to reduce the impact of heavily cited cases.
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the old statutory language.13 To give us a more accurate baseline rate of 
citations, we exclude observations from the year in which the case was 
decided and cases that received fewer than three citations per year in the 
pre-event period. As a result of these restrictions, shadow-precedent score 
is defined for 132 cases in the overridden sample, 49 in the overruled 
sample, and 113 in the control group.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the mean shadow-precedent score is 
significantly higher for cases in the overridden sample than for cases in 
the overruled sample. In the years following an override, we find that 
an average overridden case typically receives 89 percent (median = 71 
percent) of the number of annual net citations compared with the same 
case in the years prior to the override. By contrast, we find that overruled 
cases experience a significantly larger drop in citations after the event, 
falling on average to 58 percent (median = 56 percent) of the pre-event 
level of net citations. The average shadow-precedent score for cases in the 
control group is 97 percent (median = 86 percent).
Table 2 shows the average shadow-precedent score sorted by the 
depth of the superseding event. We use the Christiansen and Eskridge 
(2014) classification of depth, a scale of 1 to 5, for cases in the overridden 
group; we create a similar classification for cases in the overruled group.14 
While there is considerable variation, for both groups the most common 
depth score is 3, defined as new legislation or a subsequent case that su-
perseded both the point of law and the outcome of the prior decision.
Both for cases in the overridden group and for cases in the overruled 
group, depth of superseding event is associated with a lower shadow- 
precedent score. More relevant for the theory of shadow precedent, in 
each depth category, the shadow-precedent score is lower for cases in 
the overruled group compared with the overridden group. For exam-
ple, when depth is 3, the mean shadow-precedent score of the overruled 
group is .48 lower than the mean shadow-precedent score of the overrid-
den group (= .91 - .43); this difference is statistically significant.
Table 2 also reports the mean shadow-precedent score sorted by con-
sciousness (for legislative overrides) and by explicitness (for judicial over-
rulings). The explicitness of the superseding event is distinct from the 
13. The number of years that should be excluded may vary in different statutory con-
texts. As explained in Section 4.3, we test the robustness of our findings by excluding dif-
ferent numbers of years and then reestimating the basic model.
14. The online appendix describes the depth classification used for cases in the over-
ruled group.
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depth of the event; some cases include clear statements that a minor point 
in a prior decision is superseded while simultaneously affirming that the 
primary rule from the prior case remains good law. There is a relatively 
large difference between cases subject to an explicit judicial overruling 
(.49) and those in which the overruling is not explicit (.77); and overrides 
that strongly repudiate precedents (that is, a restorative override) have a 
far lower shadow-precedent score (mean = .70) than updating or clarify-
ing overrides (mean = .94). By contrast, conscious legislative overrides, 
as defined by Buatti and Hasen (2015), have only a slightly lower shad-
ow-precedent score (.84) than nonconscious overrides (.92).
To illustrate the effect of an override or an overruling, as compared 
with each other and with our control group, we track Citation Ratiot, 
defined as follows:
Citation Ratio
Net citations in year
Average net citations per ye
t
t=
ar in the pre-event period
.
Cases in all three groups are subject to precedent depreciation. Thus, 
whatever postevent difference we observe in shadow precedent among 
Table 2. Shadow Precedent Scores
Overridden Overruled
 Overridden - 
OverruledCount Mean Count Mean
Full sample 132 .89 49 .58 -.31** (.001)
Depth (override or overruling):
 1 14 1.20 7 1.10 -.10 (.717)
 2 16 .87 11 .65 -.22 (.277)
 3 76 .91 18 .43 -.48** (.004)
 4+ 26 .68 13 .44 -.24+ (.083)
Consciousness of override:
 Conscious 52 .84
 Not conscious 80 .92
Explicitness of overruling:
 Explicit 32 .48
 Not explicit 17 .77
Type of override:
 Restorative 29 .70
 Updating or clarifying 103 .94
Note. Values in parentheses are p-values for the difference in means.
+ Significant at the 10 percent level (two-sided test).
** Significant at the 1 percent level (two-sided test).
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the overridden group, the overruled group, and the matched control 
group can more naturally be attributed to the difference in treatment 
rather than simply depreciation over time.
Figure 1 shows the median citation ratio for cases in the overridden 
group compared with the overruled group and the control group over the 
16-year event window. For most of the postevent period, net citations of 
the overruled group are about 20 percentage points lower than those of 
the other two groups. This gap persists (and indeed widens) over the full 
10-year postevent period. The legislatively overridden group is almost in-
distinguishable from the control group.
To clarify these results, Table 3 reports for each event year the aver-
age ratio of total, positive, and negative citations divided by the average 
number of total citations to each case during the pre-event period (t < 0). 
Means are winsorized at 99 percent to reduce the impact of outliers. All 
three groups receive a small ratio (approximately 4 percent) of negative 
citations in the years prior to the event. After the event, the two super-
seded groups receive an increase in negative citations, while the control 
group’s citations remain largely unchanged. For cases in the judicially 
overruled group, this is a large increase, with the average overruled case 
receiving 12–17 percent negative citations per year immediately following 
Figure 1. Median citation ratios by treatment group
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the overruling; by contrast, an average case in the overridden group never 
receives more than 7 percent negative citations at any point over the 10 
years we track.15
Looking at total and positive citations also reveals some important 
differences. In the overruled group, there is a rapid postevent decline in 
total and positive citations. By about 5 years after the event, the prec-
edential value of the average overruled decision is cut by almost half. In 
the overridden group, by contrast, the numbers of total and positive ci-
tations decline only slightly throughout our event window. Overall, the 
overridden group appears more like the control group than the overruled 
group.
4. TESTING EXPLANATIONS FOR RELIANCE ON SHADOW PRECEDENT
The results above provide tentative support for the theory of shadow 
precedent, emphasizing that citations decline dramatically after a judicial 
overruling but only minimally after a legislative override. In this section 
we test the hypothesis using multivariate regression analysis.
There are some limitations with using net citations as a proxy for the 
precedential value of the underlying decision. First, as illustrated by Table 
3, for most cases the number of negative citations is dwarfed by the large 
number of neutral citations (and, to a lesser extent, positive citations). 
Yet negative citations—especially following an override or overruling—
are conceptually important, as they demonstrate an acknowledged and 
considered reduction in the precedential value attached to the original 
decision. Accordingly, we believe that they should be given more weight 
than a string citation with no discussion of the cited case. Second, across 
different types of cases, there is wide disparity in the average number of 
annual citations and year-to-year variance in such citations. To illustrate, 
some of the habeas corpus cases in our overridden sample receive more 
than 1,000 citations per year, while the median case in the overridden 
group receives about 26 total citations per year. The citation pattern of 
cases that receive more annual citations is not inherently more important 
for purposes of understanding shadow precedent. Yet if we were to use 
15. Interestingly, even though overrides are generally not retroactive, the highest per-
centage of negative citations occurs very quickly after the override is enacted. During 
this period, courts may be (properly) resolving decisions according to the former statu-
tory language but also flagging that an override has been enacted that will (subsequently) 
change the standard applied. Such statements may be coded as negative citations.
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net citations as our measure of precedent in the analysis below, such cases 
would be given disproportionate weight.
To address both concerns, we replace net citations with net logged ci-
tations, defined for each case (i) and each event year (t) as
Net Logged Citations Log(Positive Neutral Cited By 1)
Log(W
t = + + +
- arning Caution Questioned 1).+ + +
Because the log function is concave and most cases receive considerably 
fewer negative citations than positive or neutral citations, our measure 
of Net Logged Citations will naturally give more weight to a small fluc-
tuation in negative citations and less weight to modest fluctuations in 
positive or neutral citations to a heavily cited case. We use Net Logged 
Citations as our dependent variable in the empirical analysis below. In 
Section 4.3 we consider the robustness of our results to alternative speci-
fications of the dependent variable.
One concern for our regression analysis is that legislative overrides 
and judicial overrulings are not exogenous events. The underlying po-
litical conditions and external developments that led to an override or 
overruling may also impact how a superseded case would have been cited 
even in the absence of such an event. To address this concern, we employ 
two identification strategies in the regression analysis below: case-level 
matching and headnote-level analysis.
4.1. Case-Level Regression Analysis
Using fixed-effects regression analysis, we estimate the following equa-
tion:
 
















where i indexes cases from our sample, t indexes year relative to the event 
t ∈ [-5, 10], CaseFEi is a set of case fixed effects, X is a vector of included 
control variables, and ε is the error term. Fixed-effects analysis is particu-
larly appropriate here as it creates a pre-event baseline for each case and 
then compares how cases in each treatment group were cited pre-event 
and postevent. Fixed-effects analysis also reduces risk of omitted-variable 
bias by eliminating all time-constant effects, both observed and unob-
served (Wooldridge 2002).
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For purposes of estimating equation (1), we again exclude observa-
tions from years t = 0, 1, and 2; from the year that the case was decided; 
and from any cases that received fewer than three citations per year in the 
pre-event period. Putting these restrictions in place, we estimate equation 
(1) on panel data from all three groups of cases covering 2,510 years of 
citation data to 224 cases.
The primary explanatory variables of interest for testing the shadow- 
precedent hypothesis are Postt , which equals one if t > 0 and zero other-
wise; Post × Overrideit , which equals one if t > 0 and case i is in the 
legislative overridden sample and zero otherwise; and Post × Overruleit , 
which equals one if t > 0 and case i is in the judicial overruled sam-
ple and zero otherwise. We separately estimate the effect of an override 
as opposed to an overruling, with both coefficient estimates net of any 
change in citations to the control group. The shadow-precedent hypothe-
sis predicts that βOverride < 0, βOverruling < 0, and βOverride > βOverruling , namely, 
that shadow-precedent scores will be higher for overrides than for over-
rulings.
Table 4 presents regression results, reporting fixed-effects coefficient 
estimates. Models 1–3 apply to the full sample, while models 4–6 include 
only cases in which the CEM algorithm found a 1 : 1 match. In addition 
to our primary explanatory variables, all models include year dummy 
variables and the variable Log(Years Since Decision), which reflects non-
linear depreciation of precedent over time, as found in Black and Spriggs 
(2013).
Models 2 and 3 add explanatory variables that may help clarify to a 
lower-court judge the extent to which the precedent is superseded. The 
first such variable is Depth × Post, which equals the interaction between 
Post and the depth score assigned to the superseding event, recoded to a 
0–4 scale. We expect that deeper overrides and deeper overrulings will 
be associated with a lower shadow-precedent score. The second variable 
added is Restorative × Post, which equals one if t > 0 and the override 
is classified as restorative by Christianson and Eskridge (2014) and zero 
otherwise. As described above, we expect restorative overrides to be asso-
ciated with lower shadow-precedent scores, although the ideological di-
vision between the Court and Congress could suggest the opposite result.
We also control for subsequent Supreme Court citations to an over-
ruled or overridden precedent. Citations by the Supreme Court provide 
interpretive guidance regarding the validity of the precedent and are one 
of the few factors that have been shown to affect the typical rate at which 
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precedents depreciate (Black and Spriggs 2013). We add two variables, 
SC Postevent Nonwarning Cites and SC Postevent Warning Cites, which 
equal the number of times, as of year t, that the Court has cited the orig-
inal case—in either a nonwarning or a warning respect—since the event.
We also control for lower-court opinions issued shortly after the event 
that provide either a positive or a negative interpretation of the override 
or overruling. We hypothesize that such early decisions may set a path 
that other courts follow, even courts for which the early citation has no 
binding authority (Corley, Collins, and Calvin 2011). To operational-
ize this, we set Sideways Cites Negativeit equal to the ratio of negative 
 citations that case i received in years 1–3 to the total number of citations 
that case i received over the same time period. We define Sideways Cites 
Positiveit similarly, except it is based on positive citations over the 3 years 
immediately following the event. Both of these variables are set to zero if 
t ≤ 0.
Finally, in model 3 we add variables to control for whether the de-
cision was subject to an explicit judicial overruling (Explicit × Post) or 
a conscious legislative override (Conscious × Post). These variables are 
designed to capture whether the superseding body—Congress or the 
Court—stated clearly that it was superseding (at least in part) a prior de-
cision.16 For judicial overrulings, Explicit × Post equals one if t > 0 and 
the overruling decision was coded as explicit and zero otherwise. For leg-
islative overrides, Conscious × Post equals one if t > 0 and the override 
is included in Buatti and Hasen (2015), and zero otherwise. We expect 
that both Explicit × Post and Conscious × Post will have a negative im-
pact on net citations.
One of the benefits of using CEM is that it can reduce covariate imbal-
ance between the treatment and control groups. However, to take advan-
tage of this feature, we need to remove unmatched cases. To implement 
this, we reestimate models 1–3 limited to the sample of 141 cases with 
a 1 : 1 match in the control group. Again we exclude observations from 
years t = 0, 1, and 2; from the year that the case was decided; and from 
any cases that received fewer than three citations per year in the pre-event 
period. Putting these restrictions in place, we reestimate models 1–3 on 
panel data covering 1,874 years of citation data and 169 matched cases. 
Results are reported in models 4–6.
16. As explained more fully in the online appendix, they are not wholly comparable, 
since Conscious considers statements in both statutory language and key legislative his-
tory and Explicit looks only at the text of the controlling judicial opinion.
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In each model reported in Table 4, we find results consistent with the 
shadow-precedent hypothesis. Judicial overrulings have a stronger nega-
tive effect on postevent citations than do legislative overrides. The coef-
ficient estimates for Post × Override (-.16 to .29) and Post × Overrule 
(-.69 to -.11) make this clear. Indeed, in each model, the estimate for 
βOverrule is at least .33 less than the estimate for βOverride , and in each model 
we can confidently reject, using a Wald F-test, the null hypothesis that 
βOverride = βOverrule. By contrast, the coefficient estimate for βOverride is signifi-
cant only in two of the six models reported in Table 4, which means that 
citations to the overriden group are not significantly different from cita-
tions to the control group in all models.
As expected, we find that, in all models, Depth × Post has a signifi-
cant negative effect on postevent citations. Nonetheless, after controlling 
for depth, we still find a significantly larger drop in the number of cita-
tions to cases overruled by a judicial opinion than cases overridden by 
Congress. Model 3 also shows that cases subject to an explicit overrul-
ing or a conscious override receive fewer citations (significantly so for 
explicit overrulings) after the event but that overruled cases have lower 
shadow-precedent scores than overridden cases (that is, βOverride + βConscious 
> βOverrule + βExplicit). These findings demonstrate that our results are not 
driven by comparing high-depth explicit overrulings with low-depth un-
conscious overrides, but rather in each category we find more reliance on 
shadow precedent following a legislative override than following a judi-
cial overruling.
Finally, we compare restorative overrides with judicial overrulings. 
Table 4 shows that, everything else (including depth) being equal, we 
cannot reject that βOverride + βRestorative = βOverrule . In other words, while shal-
low and nonrestorative overrides have little effect on postevent citations, 
the relatively small group of cases superseded by a restorative override 
experience a decline in net citations that is similar to that for cases subject 
to judicial overrulings of comparable depth. Since restorative overrides 
highlight an interpretive or ideological disagreement between Congress 
and the Court, the fact that citing courts are more responsive to restor-
ative overrides than to updating or clarifying overrides (even those that 
are similarly deep) suggests that shadow precedent is more likely caused 
by information failure than by lower courts seeking to align themselves 
with the Supreme Court in areas of dispute between the Court and Con-
gress.
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4.2. Headnote-Level Regression Analysis
Our measurement of shadow precedent in the analysis above is clouded 
by the fact that a case may stand for several legal propositions, only some 
of which were impacted by the superseding event. Consequently, some 
of the citations made after an override or overruling are presumably to 
unrelated legal propositions, which adds noise to our empirical analysis. 
Our variable Depth captures this to some extent, as it distinguishes be-
tween cases in which the core reasoning is fully repudiated by an override 
or overruling and those that are only minimally affected. In this section, 
we develop an additional novel identification strategy that explicitly ad-
dresses the fact that each case represents multiple legal propositions.
LexisNexus uses distinct headnotes to divide cases into separate legal 
propositions and then tracks citations to each headnote in a case. Taking 
advantage of this feature, we randomly selected 60 cases from the over-
ridden sample and 20 cases from the overruled sample (in each group, this 
represents approximately 36 percent of the sample). We then hand coded 
each headnote for the cases in this subsample, using the following three 
classifications:17 directly superseded by the new statute or overruling case 
(category 1), arguably superseded by the new statute or overruling case 
(category 2), or unrelated to the new statute or overruling case (category 
3). This effectively gives us multiple levels of treatment, and we can com-
pare how directly superseded (category 1) propositions are cited after an 
override or overruling with arguably superseded (category 2) or unrelated 
(category 3) propositions. An advantage of this approach is that all of the 
observations come from exactly the same fact pattern. Consequently, un-
observed features of each case, even time-varying features, are unlikely to 
be a source of bias because they apply to all three categories.
Table 5 reports the average (mean) ratio of total and negative annual 
citations divided by the average number of total citations to each head-
note during the pre-event period. Pre-event, each headnote category re-
ceives a small ratio of negative citations. Postevent, there is a meaningful 
increase in negative citations to category 1 headnotes, particularly for the 
judicially overruled group. For example, negative citations to category 1 
headnotes in the overruled group increase from approximately 7 percent 
per year pre-event to 19 percent to 31 percent in the 5 years immediately 
17. Because headnote coding is complex and labor intensive, we did not classify head-
notes for all the cases in our full sample. We performed an intercoder reliability check; 74 
percent of the headnotes were classified identically. For more details on this process, see 
the online appendix.
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following the overruling. We find far less change in citation patterns to 
category 2 and 3 headnotes.
To test the shadow-precedent hypothesis on the headnote-level data, 
we use fixed-effects regression analysis to estimate the following equa-
tion:
 
















where h indexes individual headnotes from the subsample cases, t indexes 
the year relative to the event t ∈ [-5, 10], HeadnoteFEh is a fixed effect 
for each headnote, X is a vector of included control variables, and ε is the 
error term. In the headnote context, the dependent variable is defined as
 







We exclude observations from years t = 0, 1, and 2; from the year that 
the case was decided; and from any headnote that received fewer than 
two citations per year in the pre-event period.18 With these restrictions 
in place, we estimate equation (2) on panel data covering 3,453 years of 
headnote-level citation data from a group of 330 headnotes.
In the headnote context, the primary explanatory variables of interest 
are Postt, Post × Category1th , and Post × Category2th . The interaction 
terms measure the marginal difference in postevent net logged citations 
between categories 1, 2, and 3. Similar to the above process, we predict 
that βCategory1 < 0, βCategory2 < 0, and βCategory1 < βCategory2 . Table 6 pres-
ents these results. Model 7 shows that postevent citations are significantly 
lower for category 1 headnotes relative to category 3 headnotes (βCategory1 
= -.75), but category 2 headnotes are not significantly different from 
category 3 headnotes. This suggests that subsequent citations to portions 
of an opinion that provide reasoning or background related to a propo-
sition that was overridden or overruled (but that are not themselves di-
rectly superseded) are little affected by the event. Table 6 also shows that 
we can confidently reject the null hypothesis that βCategory1 = βCategory2 .
To explore whether there is a difference in citation patterns to su-
18. Since headnotes receive, on average, many fewer citations than the case as a 
whole, we use two citations per year in the pre-event period as a minimum threshold for 
inclusion in this analysis rather than the three citations per year minimum that we used in 
the case-level analysis.
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perseded headnotes after a legislative override as opposed to a judicial 
overruling, we interact the explanatory variables used in model 7 with 
Overruled. This yields three new variables: Post × Overruled, Post × 
 Category1 × Overruled, and Post × Category2 × Overruled. Adding 
these variables to model 8, we find that, consistent with the shadow- 
precedent hypothesis, there is a larger drop in the number of citations 
to category 1 headnotes following a judicial overruling compared with a 
legislative override: we reject the null hypothesis that βOverruled + βCategory1 
× Overruled = 0.




Post × Category1 -.745** -.562**
(.138) (.151)
Post × Category2 -.138 -.073
(.107) (.130)
Post × Overruled -.135
(.195)
Post × Category1 × Overruled -.403
(.298)
Post × Category2 × Overruled -.161
(.234)
R2 (within) .169 .178
Wald F-test:
 βCategory1 = βCategory2 22.13** 10.58**
 βOverruled + βCategory1 × Overruled = 0 5.40+
Note. Values are fixed-effects regression estimates on annual citations 
to headnotes from decisions that were subject to legislative override 
(n = 60) or judicial overruling (n = 20) between 1985 and 2011. 
The unit of analysis is annual citations to each headnote over a 16-
year period surrounding the event. The dependent variable is Net 
Logged Citations. To address serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
 Mullainathan 2004), standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at 
the headnote level. All regressions include year dummies and headnote 
fixed effects. N = 3,453; headnote clusters = 330.
+ Significant at the 10 percent level (two-sided test).
* Significant at the 5 percent level (two-sided test).
** Significant at the 1 percent level (two-sided test).
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4.3. Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations
In this section we explore the robustness of our results to alternative mea-
surements of precedent, alternative event windows, and the use of a bal-
anced versus unbalanced panel. We also discuss our efforts to assess the 
role that ideological differences between the courts and Congress may 
play.
4.3.1. Alternative Measurements of Precedent. Some studies that use ci-
tation data exclude neutral and cited-by references from consideration 
on the theory that such citations reveal little about the prudential sig-
nificance of a case (for example, Westerland et al. 2010).19 Our study 
includes neutral and cited-by references in the positive category because 
we felt that a neutral discussion of a case that does not flag the fact of an 
override or overruling—which would have resulted in a negative warn-
ing—is, for our purposes, a positive citation in the sense that it treats 
the precedent as presumptively valid. To investigate whether our results 
depend on this choice, we create an alternative dependent variable based 
only on positive and negative citations, with other citation categories—
namely, neutral and cited by—removed from the analysis. Our modified 
dependent variable is set equal to log(Positive + 1) - log(Negative + 
1). We then reestimate model 2 using this alternative dependent variable. 
Our results, reported in model 9 of Table 7, are qualitatively unchanged. 
We still find that there is a greater decline after a judicial overruling than 
after an override, and early interpretive guidance operates similarly to the 
models reported in Table 4.
4.3.2. Nonretroactivity of Legislative Overrides versus Retroactivity of Ju-
dicial Overrulings. Judicial overrulings typically are retroactive, whereas 
legislative overrides typically are not. Thus, judicial overrulings usually 
take effect immediately, and all cases decided after the date of the over-
ruling (t = 0) should be decided under the new standard. By contrast, 
cases decided shortly after an override will usually be based on the old 
statutory language, and thus it may still be appropriate to cite the pre-
existing precedent interpreting the prior statutory language. To address 
19. There are also some studies that use the total number of citations without dis-
tinguishing between positive, neutral, and negative citations (for example, Fowler et al. 
2007; Cross et. al. 2010). The structure of our study depends on the distinctions between 
positive and negative citations, and negative citations are far more prevalent in our data 
set, which consists of overridden and overruled cases, than in most other studies. Accord-
ingly, grouping all citations together was not a viable approach for our study.
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this problem, we use an asymmetric event window, starting 5 years before 
the event and running until 10 years after it. In addition, in the analysis 
above, we exclude the data from years t = 0, 1, and 2 when we expect 
that the nonretroactivity problem is most likely. The choice to exclude 
3 years of data, however, is admittedly arbitrary. There are presumably 
some cases decided after this 3-year period that are properly resolved ac-
cording to the standard that predated the override, and there are surely 
some cases decided during the 3-year period that should be governed by 
the amended statute.
To investigate whether our results are sensitive to the choice of how 
many years to exclude, we test two alternative approaches. First, we re-
estimate model 2, excluding 6 years (t = 0 to t = 5) of observations. 
Results are reported in model 10 in Table 7. Though we lose almost 700 
observations by expanding the nonretroactivity period, this does not 
qualitatively change our main findings. Second, we reestimate model 2, 
excluding just the year of the event (t = 0). Results are reported in model 
11. Again, our results remain largely consistent. Collectively, these mod-
els suggest that our results are not driven by delayed application of legis-
lative overrides.
4.3.3. Unbalanced versus Balanced Panel Data. Our study uses unbal-
anced panel data; the superseding event sometimes occurs fewer than 10 
years prior to 2013, the last year for which we collected citation data 
(effectively truncating the postevent period) or fewer than 5 years after 
the original decision (truncating the pre-event period). If the missing ob-
servations due to truncation or gaps in the data were random, the use of 
an unbalanced panel would not cause a concern. In our case, however, 
observations at the start of our pre-event window likely reflect a non-
random subsample of cases, because restorative overrides tend to be en-
acted much more quickly than nonrestorative overrides (and thus are dis-
proportionately likely to be excluded from that portion of the pre-event 
period).
To address this concern, we shorten the event period to a single pre-
event observation (t = -1) and a single postevent observation (t = 3) for 
each case (that is, the pre- and postevent observations that are closest in 
time to the event, other than the years excluded because of the nonretro-
activity issue). This yields a balanced sample, with exactly two observa-
tions for each case. We then reestimate model 2, with results reported in 
model 12 (Table 7). We find less reliance on shadow precedent following 
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a judicial overruling, and we can confidently reject the null hypothesis 
(that is, βOverride ≠ βOverrule). We prefer the regression analysis in Table 4, 
using unbalanced panel data, because the longer postevent window can 
better detect the full effect of the superseding event and the longer pre-
event window is less susceptible to an unusual citation pattern in the year 
immediately preceding the override or overruling. Nonetheless, it is re-
assuring that our choice to use an unbalanced panel does not seem to be 
driving our results.
4.3.4. Ideology. Positive political science models typically understand 
overrides as constraints on the Supreme Court’s ability to interpret stat-
utes in line with its ideological preferences. We hypothesized, relatedly, 
that lower courts might feel pressure to interpret overrides narrowly to 
conform to the Supreme Court’s presumed preferences. Lower-court 
judges might also use the ambiguity implicit in determining how over-
rides relate to the precedent to advance their own ideological preferences. 
Our data do not permit us to measure the ideology of individual trial 
court judges citing the overridden precedent. However, we assess the 
ideological direction of the override in relation to which party controlled 
Congress and the presidency at the time of the later decisions. This pro-
vides a rough proxy for the likelihood that an unreasonably narrow inter-
pretation of the override (to conform with the presumed preference of the 
Supreme Court or the lower court’s own ideological preferences) would 
trigger a second override.
In model 13, we reestimate model 2 with three new explanatory vari-
ables: Fed Aligned with Overridet equals 0–3 on the basis of whether in 
year t the president, the House of Representatives, and/or the Senate is 
from the same party as the direction that the override moved the law rel-
ative to the precedent.20 So, for example, if the override moved the law 
in a liberal direction relative to the precedent and if the president and a 
majority of the Senate (but not a majority of the House) were from the 
Democratic party, we would set Fed Aligned with Overridet equal to 2 in 
year t. We also include an explanatory variable Unified Control of Gov-
ernment, which equals one when one political party controls the presi-
dency and both houses of Congress and zero otherwise, as Congress may 
be less likely to pass new legislation in periods of divided government 
20. For each override, the classification of the direction in which it moved the law was 
provided to us by Matt Christianson and Bill Eskridge in conjunction with their study 
(Christianson and Eskridge 2014).
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(see, for example, Coleman 1999). We also control for whether the origi-
nal case was a liberal decision by adding the variable Liberal Case × Post. 
We find no evidence that reliance on shadow precedent is driven by ide-
ology. Also, as discussed above, restorative overrides tend to have lower 
shadow- precedent scores than nonrestorative overrides, even though the 
ideological divides between Congress and the Court are far more pro-
nounced in this context. However, our measure of ideology is admittedly 
crude, and this may be a fruitful area for further research.
5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The assumption that a legislative override is equivalent to a judicial over-
ruling is incorrect. After a judicial overruling, the number of total cita-
tions and net citations drops quickly and sharply, and negative citations 
become quite common. Within about 6 years after the event, the prec-
edential weight of the decision has been cut roughly in half. But after 
a congressional override, the number of total citations and net citations 
drops only a little, and negative citations remain relatively rare. Many 
overridden decisions are still widely cited even 10 years after the override. 
In addition, although there is a more noticeable decrease in citations after 
a relatively deep override than after a shallow override, at every level of 
depth, the number of citations drops more rapidly after a judicial over-
ruling than after a statutory override. Existing debate has centered on the 
extent to which court action is constrained by the threat of a potential 
override. Our findings suggest that, even after an override, courts may be 
unconstrained.
Our data do not establish definitively what causes the differences we 
observe, but we suggest that information failure or judicial error are im-
portant factors. Litigants and courts simply may not realize that a stat-
utory provision has been enacted that calls into question the validity 
of the precedent. Consistent with this, we found that restorative over-
rides—which are more likely to address specific judicial precedents in 
statutory language or legislative history and are more likely to be heavily 
publicized—result in lower levels of shadow precedent than nonrestor-
ative overrides. We also hypothesized that lower courts, even if aware 
of an override, might be unsure how to synthesize it with precedent. We 
predicted that clear signals from Congress and from other judicial ac-
tors could reduce reliance on overridden precedents, and we find results 
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broadly consistent with this explanation. It is also possible that courts use 
the ambiguity implicit in overrides to advance ideological preferences, ei-
ther their own or the presumed preferences of reviewing courts. Although 
our results do not establish this, future researchers may wish to design 
tests to assess the potential impact of ideology on interpretation of over-
rides more directly.
We were particularly struck by our findings regarding nonrestorative 
overrides, those that are intended to update or clarify statutory law. 
Christiansen and Eskridge (2014) demonstrate that the Supreme Court 
often explicitly invites such overrides on the grounds that they should be 
enacted by the legislative branch rather than implemented through statu-
tory interpretation by unelected judges. Congress heeds these calls by en-
acting new statutory provisions. But we find that, in many respects, cita-
tion levels to cases overridden by such statutes are very similar to citation 
levels to cases in our control group.
One would hope, of course, that lawyers would bring all relevant 
statutory developments to the attention of courts and that courts, in any 
case, would properly apply the controlling statutory law. To probe this 
question further—and to help distinguish information failures from other 
potential explanations—it would be helpful to analyze whether lawyers’ 
briefing regarding overrides affects courts’ ongoing reliance on shadow 
precedents. That analysis is beyond the scope of our project, but perhaps 
it can be explored in future research. Even in the absence of empirical 
evidence on point, it seems apparent that lawyers should more fully inte-
grate the analysis of overrides in crafting their legal arguments. Lawyers 
need to carefully read the statutory language that governs resolution of 
a dispute and consider whether judicial decisions interpreting the statute 
predate any changes to the statutory language. This is true not only for 
Supreme Court decisions but also for lower-court decisions that may rely 
on Supreme Court precedent that has been superseded. Courts, likewise, 
are charged with interpreting and implementing existing law, and they 
may be expected to do such research even if the lawyers appearing before 
them have not properly briefed changes (see Widiss [2015] for a fuller 
discussion of the respective responsibilities of lawyers and courts).
LexisNexis, Westlaw, and other legal research resources could also re-
consider the coding protocols that they use for flagging that a judicial 
precedent has been affected by subsequent statutory actions. As described 
more fully in Widiss (2014), these services rely primarily on judicial state-
ments indicating that a statutory amendment has superseded a precedent 
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before flagging the precedent. This necessarily builds in a lag time, which 
is often several years. Relying on judicial signals makes sense in a purely 
common-law-based system, but the approach may be reconsidered for 
statutory decisions.
Even more fundamentally, if Congress seeks, in enacting an over-
ride, to end reliance on the relevant portion of the preexisting precedent, 
congressional drafters should make the relationship between statutory 
amendments and prior case law clear in the statutory language. Adminis-
trative agencies could also help explain how statutory amendments affect 
the validity of precedents. These changes could facilitate prompt flagging 
by legal research databases and make it easier for lawyers to understand 
the extent to which (if any) the precedent remains controlling.
Our findings suggest that overrides often fail to actually override. This 
is a significant problem for bedrock principles of legislative supremacy. If 
Congress is, in fact, to serve as the primary source of statutory law, all of 
these actors—Congress, administrative agencies, legal research services, 
lawyers, and ultimately courts—need to endeavor to ensure that over-
rides are implemented effectively.
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ONLINE APPENDIX:  
After the Override: an Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent 
 
Appendix A: Identifying and Classifying Overridden and Overruled Cases 
Conceptually, it is straightforward to define both statutory overrides and judicial overrulings. They 
are events (either newly-enacted statutory provisions or new judicial opinions) that supersede a 
prior judicial decision, thus changing the applicable law that will govern a given factual scenario. 
Often it is obvious that a given statute or decision meets this definition. At the margins, however, the 
line between overriding and codifying (Christiansen & Eskridge (2014), p. 1325), and the line 
between overruling and distinguishing (Brenner & Spaeth (1995), p. 20), may be unclear. Relatedly, 
both overrides and overrulings vary as to depth (i.e., how completely do they supersede the rule 
announced by the prior case?) and explicitness (i.e., how clear was Congress or the Court that it was 
replacing a rule from a prior judicial decision?).  
This appendix provides additional information about how the samples of overridden and overruled 
cases that we use in our study were identified; how depth and explicitness were assessed; and how 
questions of identification and classification may affect our results.  
Overridden Cases 
We define our sample of overridden cases using data from Christiansen & Eskridge (2014). This study 
sought to identify all statutory interpretation cases that had been overridden by statutes enacted 
1967-2011. It updated and expanded on an earlier study by Eskridge (1991) that had sought to 
identify all cases overridden by statutes enacted 1967-1990.  
The Eskridge studies define an override as a statutory provision that: 
(1) Completely overrules the holding of a statutory interpretation decision, just as a 
subsequent Court would overrule an unsatisfactory precedent; (2) modifies the result 
of a decision in some material way, such that the same case would have been decided 
differently; or (3) modifies the consequences of the decision, such that the same case 
would have been decided in the same way but subsequent cases would be decided 
differently.  
Eskridge (1991), p. 332 n.1. Christiansen & Eskridge (2014) used both legislative history and 
subsequent judicial indications that a statute had superseded a prior decision to identify potential 
overrides (Christiansen & Eskridge (2014); Widiss (2014)). Because they relied on subsequent 
judicial opinions, they suggest their list (and thus our list) may be incomplete for more recent years 
(Christiansen & Eksridge (2014), p. 1342-43). As discussed below, recent studies by Hasen (2013) 
and Buatti & Hasen (2015) adopt a different approach to identifying overrides that we also 
incorporate into our analysis.  
Type of Override 
Christiansen & Eskridge (2014) develops a new taxonomy for overrides, distinguishing between 
overrides that are “restorative,” defined as those that repudiate a prior judicial interpretation as 
contrary to the original Congressional intent, and those that update or clarify the law but do not 
indicate that the original judicial interpretation was a misinterpretation of the old law. 
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About one-fifth of the overrides in Christiansen & Eskridge (2014) are restorative. When passing 
restorative overrides, Congress is often quite clear about its frustration with the prior judicial ruling. 
For example, in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Congress stated in the statute itself that the Court’s 
prior decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) had “significantly 
impair[ed] statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that Congress established 
and that have been bedrock principles of American law for decades.” (Pub. L. No. 111-2 (2009)). Not 
all restorative overrides are this strident, and such context may be found in legislative history rather 
than statutory language; nonetheless, most unambiguously reject the prior precedent. Additionally, 
because of the power struggle inherent in restorative overrides, they often receive significant 
coverage in legal and popular press—and such coverage typically focuses on the “fight” between 
Congress and the Court. They are prevalent in areas such as civil rights or employment 
discrimination, where there are sharp partisan divides and where Congress in recent years has 
sometimes been more liberal than the Supreme Court.  
Approximately two-thirds of the overrides in Christiansen & Eskridge (2014) are classified as 
“updating” overrides. In passing such overrides, Congress does not denigrate the prior ruling; it 
simply puts in place a new statutory standard that is better aligned with current policy priorities 
(Christiansen & Eskridge (2014), at p. 1370). Updating overrides are a mechanism for responding to 
changes and developments in the law or society. For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
of 1998, Pub. L. 105-304 (1998), created new liability for circumvention of copyright protection 
mechanisms. In so doing, it overrode a portion of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 
U.S. 417 (1984), which had held that sale of VCRs that permitted copying protected content did not 
violate copyright laws. Notably, in Sony, the Supreme Court had invited such a policy intervention by 
Congress, stating explicitly that the Court had to be “circumspect in construing the scope of rights 
creative by legislative enactment” where Congress had not charted the path for how new 
technological developments should be handled. Id. at 431. Major overhauls of statutory law, such as 
revisions to the tax code, the bankruptcy code, civil procedure rules, intellectual property laws, or 
habeas statutes often include numerous updating overrides. 
Finally, Christiansen & Eskridge (2014) classify about 10% of the overrides as primarily “clarifying” 
the law. For example, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-21, overrode 
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2007), a fractured decision interpreting the federal money 
laundering statute. Because Santos did not have a majority opinion, lower courts were not sure what 
rule was established by the case. The new act replaced the confusing standard with a single, clear 
command.    
Not surprisingly, restorative overrides are typically enacted much more quickly than updating 
overrides. Specifically, in our study, the average time between a restorative override and the decision 
itself is approximately 4.7 years, as compared to 9.5 years for a non-restorative override.1 
Depth of Override 
Overrides also range in “depth”—that is, the extent to which they supersede the prior decision. 
Christiansen & Eskridge (2014, at p. 1533) assigned a five-point depth scale to capture this reality: 
1 = override made a marginal change in the law;  
2 = override overrules the point of law but leaves the prior decision in tact;  
                                                          
1 Consequently, our panel data are unbalanced, a point that we address in Section 4.C. 
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3 = override overrules the point of law and the outcome in the prior decision;  
4 = override renounces the reasoning (often indicates a restorative override);  
5 = override renounces the reasoning and the outcome.  
This variable is helpful to our study, since one would expect that citations to a case superseded by a 
“deep” override would decrease more than citations to a case superseded by a “shallow” override. 
Although depth is correlated with “type” of override, they are analytically distinct, as shown in the 
tabulation below (using data from our study): 
Depth of Override Restorative Non-Restorative 
1 0 15 
2 0 20 
3 18 79 
4 19 11 
5 0 2 
 
“Conscious” Overrides 
Two recent papers, Hasen (2013) and Buatti & Hasen (2015), take a different approach to identifying 
overrides. They include only overrides where review of the statutory language or key legislative 
history indicates that Congress was “consciously” responding to a prior judicial decision. Buatti & 
Hasen (2015) conclude that there have been 71 overrides since 1991, as compared to 122 included 
in Christiansen & Eskridge (2014) for the same time period. Buatti & Hasen (2015) identifies a higher 
percentage of restorative overrides than non-restorative overrides, suggesting (not surprisingly) 
that legislative history and statutory language in restorative overrides often contains specific 
statements referring to a disfavored judicial decision. Specifically, Buatti & Hasen (2015) includes 
76% of the restorative overrides in our sample, compared to 26% of all overrides in our sample.  
We use Christiansen & Eskridge (2014) to compile our sample because, once enacted, an override—
that is, the new or newly-amended statutory law—should control resolution of a dispute whether or 
not Congress “knew” that a new statutory standard was superseding a prior judicial interpretation. 
However, we also recognize that lower courts might be more responsive to overrides where it is 
apparent that Congress “meant” to supersede a prior judicial decision than to overrides that could 
have been inadvertent or accidental. This might be particularly true if the terms of the override are 
at all ambiguous. Thus, we use “consciousness,” as defined by Buatti & Hasen (2015), as an 
explanatory variable in our regression analysis.   
 
Overruled Cases 
Our sample of overruled cases came from Brenner & Spaeth (1995) and the Supreme Court Database 
(SCD), originally developed by Harold Spaeth.2  We searched in the database for cases that were 
                                                          
2 The description of the category “formal alteration of precedent” in the Supreme Court Database’s codebook 
is consistent with—but somewhat less detailed than—the description of the factors used to identify 
overruled precedents in Brenner & Spaeth (1995). Compare SCD Online Code Book, Formal Alteration of 
Precedent, available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=precedentAlteration, with Brenner & 
Spaeth (1995), pp. 18-23.  We reviewed the cases that were identified in the SCD for the time period covered 
in Brenner & Spaeth and found them to be consistent. Accordingly, we assume that the fuller description 
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identified as “formally altering precedent.” 3 We then relied upon the research in Brenner & Spaeth 
(1995), and our own research of decisions for the more recent cases, to identify the precedent case(s) 
that the overruling cases had altered. 
The category of “formally altering precedent” is defined as cases that indicate that an earlier Supreme 
Court decision is “overruled,” “disapproved,” “no longer good law,” “can no longer be considered 
controlling,” “modified and narrowed,” or that the Court “decline[s] to follow” an aspect of the earlier 
decision. It generally does not include cases that merely distinguish a prior precedent without 
indicating that the prior precedent is disapproved in some manner, at least in part (Brenner & Spaeth, 
1995, p. 19-22). Brenner & Spaeth (1995) indicate that they relied primarily on majority opinions in 
making these assessments. However, they explain that in some instances, cases were identified as 
fitting within this category based on statements in dissenting opinions that a fair reading of the 
majority opinion was that it overruled a prior decision, even if the majority opinion itself did not 
admit this. Additionally, some cases were identified based on opinions in subsequent cases that 
indicated an earlier case had substantively overruled an even earlier decision. They note that this 
suggests that the universe of overruled cases in the SCD (and thus in our sample) may not be 
complete, in that there may be some additional cases that will later be identified as having overruled 
a prior precedent (Brenner & Spaeth (1995), p. 210). As stated above, Christiansen & Eskridge (2014) 
make the same point with respect to the overridden decisions. 
We recognize that the Court engages in what has been characterized as “stealth” overruling, issuing 
decisions that distinguish or ignore precedents that would be expected to control the outcome of a 
case without acknowledging that the decision functionally overrules the prior decisions (see, e.g., 
Eskridge (1988); Friedman (2010); Epstein et al. (2015)). The SCD presumably captures at least 
some of these “stealth” overrulings through its consideration of dissents and later opinions. However, 
many will not be included in the SCD’s “formal alteration of precedent” category and thus are not in 
our analysis. This could affect our study, to the extent that our sample of overrides may include what 
could be characterized as “stealth” overrides.4 We include depth and consciousness/explicitness as 
explanatory variables to control, at least in part, for this potential difference between our treatment 
groups. 
The fact that some overrulings are “gradual”—in that sometimes an earlier decision narrows 
dramatically or undermines a prior decision and then a later decision explicitly overrules the prior 
                                                          
found in Brenner & Speath (1995) is applicable to the SCD as well, even in the years post-dating the 
conclusion of Brenner & Spaeth’s 1995 study, particularly since Spaeth created the database and has played a 
key role in maintaining it. See SCD Primary Investigators, available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/about.php?s=3.  
3We chose to use the SCD/Brenner & Spaeth list of overruled cases because it has been used in several other 
studies (see, e.g., Epstein et al. (2015); Hansford & Spriggs 2006) and because it covered our full time period. 
There are other sources that seek to identify all overrulings for at least portions of the time period we study, 
including Gerhardt (2008) and the Congressional Research Service’s The Constitution of the United States of 
America, Analysis and Interpretation. These lists have high levels of overlap with the SCD list, but they are not 
entirely consistent. Eskridge (1988) used a broader definition of what constitutes an “overruling” in 
cataloguing statutory interpretation decisions that overruled earlier statutory interpretation decisions; this 
study ended in 1987, near the beginning of our research window, and thus we could not use it to define our 
sample of cases.  
4 Our hunch is that lower courts are relatively sensitive to such signals from the Supreme Court and likely 
decrease their reliance on “stealthily” overruled precedents to a considerable degree (and more than they 
reduce reliance on “stealthily” overridden precedents), but substantiating that phenomenon is beyond the 
scope of our study. 
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decision—has additional implications for our study. In such instances, lower courts sometimes 
express doubts as to which rule should apply, or circuits may split on the issue. Once the Supreme 
Court grants certiorari, lower courts may flag the issue as pending resolution. These factors may help 
explain why we observe in Figure 1 a gradual increase in citations to “overruled” cases in the years 
immediately prior to the event.  
Depth of Overruling 
As noted in the paper, overrulings, like overrides, vary in depth, ranging from cases that entirely 
supplant the rule announced by the earlier decision to cases that make only a minor tweak. To assess 
how “depth” affects subsequent citation patterns, and to permit us to better compare overrides to 
overruling, we developed a depth code for “overrulings”, based on the classifications used by 
Christiansen & Eskridge (2014) for overrides. Specifically, the depth code that we used for 
overrulings was as follows: 
1 = distinguishes (or explicitly overrules) prior case on a minor point but generally 
follows the approach of the earlier case other than the minor disagreement;  
2 = significantly narrows the rule of the earlier case, or identifies a broad or narrow 
reading of the earlier decision and chooses the narrower reading;   
3 = distinguishes (or explicitly overrules) the reasoning of the prior case and reaches 
a different general rule;  
4 = renounces the reasoning of the prior case;  
5 = renounces the reasoning and the outcome of the prior case. 
If the overruling case was a plurality decision, depth was assessed based on the concurrence that 
provided the necessary fifth vote, rather than the plurality opinion.  We found considerable variation 
in “depth” for the cases in the overruled group, as shown in the table below:   








We also sought to assess whether the explicitness of an overruling affected ongoing citation patterns. 
As noted above, cases were included in the SCD’s category of “formally altering precedent” based on 
a wide range of signals, from “overruled” to simply “declined to follow.” Additionally, although cases 
were identified primarily based on the majority opinions, in some instances cases were included 
based on dissents or statements in later opinions. An example of this is American Trucking Ass’ns v. 
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), which is included in our dataset as overruling two earlier cases. The 
majority opinion suggested that it was merely distinguishing these earlier cases, whereas the dissent 
states that the majority opinion “directly overrules” them and argues that they should have been 
followed on stare decisis grounds (Id. at 298, O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
To get a better understanding of how important clarity might be, we coded for whether the majority 
opinion, or the controlling concurring opinion if the decision did not have a majority opinion, 
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included an explicit statement that it was overruling a prior decision.5 We found that approximately 
two-thirds of the cases in our overruled group included such language, while one-third did not.  
The explicitness of an overruling is analytically distinct from depth; in other words, some overrulings 
were clear that they were superseding an aspect of a prior decision but also clear that they were 
leaving the core holding of a prior decision in place. For example, Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), is in our database as (partially) overruling Thermtron Products, Inc. v. 
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976). The key issue in Thermtron was whether a federal district court 
could remand a case back to state court simply because the federal court had a “crowded docket,” 
and a related issue of whether such a decision was subject to appellate review. The Court held a 
crowded docket was not a proper grounds for remand, that the district court’s decision to remand 
was reviewable, and that the writ of mandamus filed in the case was an appropriate vehicle for such 
review. In reaching this holding, the Thermtron Court stated in passing that an order remanding a 
removed action was not a final judgment that could be reviewed by appeal. Id. at 352. The 
Quackenbush Court explicitly “disavowed” this single statement in Thermtron, noting that the vehicle 
used for review was “peripheral” to the core issue in the case (such that it had not even been briefed) 
and that the statement was in tension with other precedents, see Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714-15; 
importantly, however, the Quackenbush Court also followed the more general reasoning in Thermtron 
regarding the applicable federal statutes, see id. at 711-12. Thus, we coded this as an explicit but 
shallow overruling.    
An “explicit” overruling can be understood as a rough analog to a “conscious” legislative override.   
However, this is not an apples-to-apples comparison. In defining “consciousness” Buatti & Hasen 
(2015) looked at both statutory language and key legislative history. This means that lower court 
judges or lawyers simply looking at the statutory language of a “conscious” override would not 
necessarily find an “explicit” signal of disapproval comparable to an “explicit” statement that a case 
has been overruled.6 Consequently, we include both “explicit” and “conscious” as separate 
explanatory variables in our regression analysis, and we do not assume they will necessarily have 
the same effect on shadow precedent. 
 
Overruling Cases that Were Later Overridden  
There were four cases in our dataset that were identified both as a case that overruled a prior 
precedent and as a case that was itself overridden. This typically occurred when the Court changed a 
prior settled judicial interpretation by overruling an earlier case and Congress disagreed with the 
change. For example, Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), established the basic proof 
                                                          
5 The vast majority of the cases we coded as “explicit” included straightforward statements that the prior 
decision was (at least partially) “overruled.” In some instances, we also included cases with statements that a 
prior precedent was “disavowed,” “disclaimed,” or “no longer controlling” where we deemed the larger 
discussion made it abundantly clear that this meant the prior decision was, in fact, at least partially overruled. 
Other signals, such as “modified and narrowed” or “rejected” might likewise be considered “explicit” evidence 
of an overruling, but we generally did not include them. This suggests that our “explicit” category might be 
somewhat underinclusive.   
6 We separately coded for whether the name of the overridden case was included in the text of the statute 
itself. This was true for just 7% of the overrides in our sample. Even this standard is not a perfect proxy for 
“explicitness” of an overruling, since such statements are typically in “findings and purposes” clauses that 
may not be codified adjacent to the substantive language at issue in a given case. 
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structure used to assess “disparate impact” claims under employment discrimination statutes. In 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court substantively overruled portions of 
Griggs to make it significantly easier for businesses to defend against such claims. Wards Cove was a 
highly controversial decision, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. 102-166, overrode it. Wards Cove 
is both an “overruling” event (with respect to Griggs) and an “overridden” decision (with respect to 
the 1991 Civil Rights Act).  
Under our research design, we typically would track citations to Griggs for the 10 years following 
Wards Cove (from 1989-1999) to assess how quickly citations to Griggs, the overruled case, declined. 
However, the 1991 Civil Rights Act largely restored the standard initially enunciated in Griggs, 
making Griggs, once again, “good law.” To ensure that our results were not distorted by this 
subsequent Congressional action, we only tracked citations to Griggs up to 1991, the point at which 
Congress overrode Wards Cove and reinstated the Griggs standard.  There were three other cases that 
fell into this category. For each, we tracked citations to the original “overruled” case only until the 
point at which the override of the overruling case occurred.  
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Appendix B: Shepard’s Signal Indicators 
Our analysis uses the Shepard’s Signal Indicators assigned to citations by the Shepard’s Citations 
Service, as reported by the Lexis database. Shepard’s has many distinct signals that it assigns to case 
citations—e.g., “distinguished” or “explained” or “affirmed”. The Signal Indicators group these 
specific signals into broad categories as follows:7 
 
 
We did not independently assess the reliability of the signal indicators, but Spriggs & Hansford 
(2000) evaluated their accuracy and found them to be generally reliable, with the stronger negative 
treatment codes being the most reliable. Accordingly, we believe that the distinction between 
“positive” cites and “negative” cites that we use in our analysis likely captures real differences in how 
courts cite to prior precedents.  
                                                          




That said, Spriggs & Hansford (2000) only assessed reliability of citations in subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions; it may be that Shepard’s has higher levels of quality control for accuracy in coding 
Supreme Court decisions than lower court decisions. Additionally, the interpretive complexity 
implicit in integrating overrides into analysis of precedent may result in a higher level of false 
positives and false negatives than is typical. (As discussed in Widiss (2014), Christiansen and 
Eskridge (2014) study of overrides, which uses Westlaw flags, uncovered relatively high numbers of 
false positive and false negative flags.) Despite these limitations, use of Shepard’s signals was 







Appendix C: Headnote Coding Protocol 
As explained in the text, we used LexisNexis “headnotes”, and the possibility of Shepardizing by 
headnote, to gain a clearer understanding of which propositions within a given case were being relied 
upon by later cases. 60 cases that were overridden and 20 cases that were overruled were randomly 
selected for this analysis. This randomized list was created using Excel’s random number 
generator—function: =RAND().  
After identifying cases for analysis, we read the case, the override statute or overruling case, and, in 
some cases, additional later cases or explanatory materials to assess how the override statute or 
overruling case interacted with the precedent case. Then, for each of the randomly selected cases, 
each LexisNexis “headnote” was initially coded using 5 numerical classifications, although, as 
described below, we ultimately combined two categories for analysis and discarded one category for 
analysis, yielding the 3 numerical classifications that we address in the text:  
1—Propositions that were directly superseded by the new statute or directly overruled by the later 
decision. Headnotes were coded as a “1” if any aspect of the statement in the headnote would no 
longer be correct under the new governing standard established by the override statute or the 
overruling case. Sometimes a single headnote would include both statements that were superseded 
and statements that were not addressed by the override or overruling.  
2—Reasoning supporting the proposition that was overridden or overruled but not squarely 
superseded by the text of the override or overruling opinion. This category now includes assertions 
of general interpretive methodologies (e.g., canons of statutory interpretation) that were cited in 
support of the proposition that was subsequently overridden. Originally, such canons were 
separately coded.  
3—Issues addressed in the case that were totally irrelevant to the override or overruling (e.g., 
procedural issues, other statutory provisions, etc.). This included interpretive methodologies that 
supported propositions irrelevant to the override or overruling, as well as citations to statutory 
provisions that were totally unrelated to the override or overruling.  
When we originally coded the headnotes, we included a fourth category that was used for very 
general descriptions of the statute at issue in the override or overruling; paraphrases or quotations 
of relevant statutory language; and headnotes that simply listed the statutory provision interpreted 
in the proposition that was superseded without additional text. Because many of these headnotes 
were simply to statutory provisions without discussion, and often the statutory provision remained 
the same even after an override had been enacted, or the overruling case had been decided, it was 
unclear whether subsequent citations to these headnotes were functionally citing the prior precedent 
or the new rule. Accordingly, we dropped them from our analysis.  
Two aspects of this coding protocol require further elaboration. With some regularity, later statutory 
amendments added language to a statute that was within plausible meaning of the pre-existing 
language. For example, Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1996), concerned whether 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1), which provided mandatory minimum sentences for “use” of a firearm in relation to certain 
crimes, encompassed possession of a firearm. Circuits had split on the issue. The Court interpreted 
“use” to require more than mere possession. Congress subsequently amended the relevant provision 
to explicitly permit the enhancement for “possess[ion] of a firearm” “in furtherance of any such 
crime.” The headnote in Bailey stating that “use” must connote more than mere possession was coded 
as a “1” since possession would now lead to the sentencing enhancement, even though the Court’s 
interpretation of “use” as requiring more than “possession” arguably remains controlling.  
Additionally, in some instances, the statutory provision actually interpreted in the overridden case 
remained unchanged, but Congress passed a new statute or added a new provision that had the effect 
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of changing the result at issue in the case. For example, United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 
(1988), concerned the meaning 18 U.S.C. § 1584, which prohibits knowingly and willfully holding an 
individual in “involuntary servitude.” The Court interpreted this phrase to require a showing of use 
or threat of physical harm or legal coercion, rather than use of other forms of coercion such as 
psychological coercion. The Court drew this meaning from prior interpretations of the 13th 
Amendment, which also uses the phrase “involuntary servitude.” The override added a new 
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, that criminalizes forced labor through physical, legal, or other 
psychological, emotional, or reputational coercion, as a means of criminalizing the kind of behavior 
that had been at stake in Kozminski. Although 18 U.S.C. § 1584’s meaning may not have technically 
changed, the new provision encompasses the conduct at issue in the case being interpreted, and the 
headnotes discussion 18 U.S.C. § 1584 as requiring a showing of physical or legal coercion rather than 
other forms of coercion were coded as “1s”. Headnotes discussing the 13th Amendment’s meaning, by 
contrast, were coded as “2s”, since the override cannot change the meaning of the constitutional term.  
This research design was chosen because it let us efficiently sort later citations according to which 
principles in the overridden or overruled case were relied upon. That said, it was obviously 
dependent on—and therefore in some ways limited by—LexisNexis’s editorial choices regarding 
headnotes. We chose to use LexisNexis’s headnotes rather than Westlaw’s key cites because a review 
of a sample of cases suggested that LexisNexis’s headnotes were usually more detailed than 
Westlaw’s, and LexisNexis seems more frequently to include interpretative methodologies in the 
headnotes. That said, there was wide variability in the detail in which LexisNexis assigned headnotes 
to the cases in our dataset. For example, some cases had as few as one headnote, while others had as 
many as twenty-eight, with the variation only partially explained by differences in the numbers of 
issues addressed in cases.  
In a small number of cases in our dataset, none of the headnotes in the case articulated the 
proposition that was later superseded. Thus, in some cases in our dataset, none of the headnotes 
were assigned a “1”, though there were always “2”s that were related to the superseded proposition. 
In many cases, LexisNexis editors identified in headnotes numerous different interpretative 
methodologies as well as substantive application of those principles. But in some cases, including 
other cases which likewise used several interpretative methodologies, none of the interpretative 
methodologies were included among the headnotes. This was true even for some cases, such as Reno 
v. Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. 320 (2000), which are frequently cited for the interpretative methodologies 
employed. The opposite was true as well; in a few instances, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village Inc., 
503 U.S. 30 (1991), the headnotes all focused on interpretative methodologies and none delved into 
the substance of the actual statute at stake in the case. Thus, our analysis derived from shepardizing 
by headnotes cannot capture entirely the various principles for which the cases in our dataset are 
cited.  
In general the scale worked relatively well, but coding sometimes required difficult judgment calls 
regarding precisely what was superseded (affecting the lines between “1” and “2”), as well as where 
the lines between “specific supporting reasoning” (“2”) and general background (the category we 
later discarded)  should be drawn. Occasionally, there was also some level of judgment call required 
to distinguish “irrelevant” (“3”) from “background reasoning” (“2”). We found that it particularly 
difficult to code cases concerning habeas corpus on this scale, because habeas cases typically relied 
heavily on a detailed and extensive background of precedent that concerned largely constitutional 
principles and prior decisions.  
Fourteen overridden cases were coded by two individuals to determine a measure of inter-coder 
reliability. One case was used as model that we walked through together. We then each 
independently coded an additional nine, met to discuss these cases, and then independently coded 
an additional four, which we also met to discuss.  
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There were 171 headnotes coded by both individuals. Using our revised scale that combined 
interpretative methodologies with other supportive reasoning, but includes the fourth category that 
we ultimately discarded from analysis, there was complete agreement for 73.7% of the footnotes 
(using the five-point scale we employed originally, there was complete agreement on 71.3% of the 
headnotes). There was disagreement by 1 number (e.g., one would code the proposition a “1” and 
one would code the proposition a “2”) for 24% of the headnotes. There were only three headnotes 
(1.7%) on which the coding differed by two numbers. In each instance in which we disagreed as to 
the classification, we met, discussed the issue, and then jointly decided which classification we 
thought was appropriate. In many instances, the headnotes on which we disagreed were headnotes 
that one or both of us had flagged as “on-the-line” between two numbers. In some instances as well, 
the “same” issue would explain differences on multiple distinct headnotes within a given case. For 
example, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), concerned interaction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state 
law, and three headnotes simply referenced the particular New Mexico statute at issue in the case. 
One of us coded all three as irrelevant to the interpretation of the federal statute, while the other one 
of us coded all three as general background (the category that we subsequently excluded from 
analysis). This was counted as three different headnotes on which our coding differed. 
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Appendix D: STATA commands for replication of regression results 
To allow replication of our regression results, we have posted, as supplemental materials on the 
Journal of Legal Studies website, two data files: 
 
 Case Level Data - Sept 2016.dta 
 Headnote Level Data - Sept 2016.dta 
 
The first file – Case Level Data - Sept 2016.dta – can be used to estimate the regressions models in 
Tables 4 and 7.  The second file – Headnote Level Data - Sept 2016.dta – can be used to estimate the 
regression models reported in Table 6.  
 
This appendix provides STATA commands for replicating each model reported in the paper.  Except 
as indicated in the notes below, variable definitions are included in the text of the paper. 
 
Regression commands for Table 48 
 
use “Case Level Data - Sept 2016.dta” 
 
M1 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled Log_YSD i.citingyear 
if deadzone12==0 & yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & first_year!=1 & t!=0 
& PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
 
M2 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled depth_x_post_all 
Restorative_p negativeDV_Learn123_post positiveDV_Learn123_post 
sc_post_netcitations sc_post_warning Log_YSD i.citingyear if deadzone12==0 
& yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & first_year!=1 & t!=0 & 
PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
test post_override + Restorative_p = post_overruled 
 
M3 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled depth_x_post_all 
Restorative_p conscious_p explicit_p negativeDV_Learn123_post 
positiveDV_Learn123_post sc_post_netcitations sc_post_warning Log_YSD 
i.citingyear if deadzone12==0 & yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & 
first_year!=1 & t!=0 & PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
test post_override + Restorative_p = post_overruled 
test post_override + conscious_p = post_overruled + explicit_p 
 
  
                                                          
8 The variable “deadzone12” equals 1 if t=1 or t=2, otherwise deadzone12 = 0. The variable “yearsbetween” 
equals the number of years between the original decision and the superseding event.  The variable 
“PrePostData” is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the case includes observations at t=-1 and t=3 and 
otherwise is set to zero.  The variable “mean_pre_z” equals the average number of citations that the case 




xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled Log_YSD i.citingyear 
if deadzone12==0 & yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & first_year!=1 & 
matched==1 & t!=0 & PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
 
M5 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled depth_x_post_all 
Restorative_p negativeDV_Learn123_post positiveDV_Learn123_post 
sc_post_netcitations sc_post_warning Log_YSD i.citingyear if deadzone12==0 
& yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & first_year!=1 & matched==1 & t!=0 & 
PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
test post_override + Restorative_p = post_overruled 
 
M6 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled depth_x_post_all 
Restorative_p conscious_p explicit_p negativeDV_Learn123_post 
positiveDV_Learn123_post sc_post_netcitations sc_post_warning Log_YSD 
i.citingyear if deadzone12==0 & yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & 
first_year!=1 & matched==1 & t!=0 & PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
test post_override + Restorative_p = post_overruled 




Regression commands for Table 69 
use “Headnote Level Data - Sept 2016.dta” 
 
M7 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_c1 post_c2 i.citing_year if deadzone12==0 & 
yearsbetween!=0 & first_year==0 & mean_pre_z > 2 &  hn_c3==0 & t!=0, fe 
vce(robust) 
test post_c1 = post_c2 
 
M8 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_c1 post_c2 Overruled_post Overruled_C1_post 
Overruled_C2_post i.citing_year if deadzone12==0 & yearsbetween!=0 & 
first_year==0 & mean_pre_z > 2 &  hn_c3==0 & t!=0, fe vce(robust) 
test post_c1 = post_c2 
test Overruled_post + Overruled_C1_post = 0 
 
 
                                                          
9 The variable “hn_c3” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the headnote provides a general descriptions of the 
statute at issue in the override or overruling or if the headnote only listed the statutory provision interpreted 
in the proposition that was superseded without additional text.  As explained in Appendix C, these headnotes 
are excluded from the analysis.  For the headnote analysis, the panelvar for purposes of STATA’s xtset 
command is “usc_HN_partial” 
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Regression commands for Table 7 
use “Case Level Data - Sept 2016.dta” 
 
M9 
xtreg NewDV4 post post_override post_overruled depth_x_post_all 
Restorative_p negativeDV_Learn123_post positiveDV_Learn123_post 
sc_post_netcitations sc_post_warning Log_YSD i.citingyear if deadzone12==0 
& yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & first_year!=1 & t!=0 & 
PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
 
M10 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled depth_x_post_all 
Restorative_p negativeDV_Learn123_post positiveDV_Learn123_post 
sc_post_netcitations sc_post_warning Log_YSD i.citingyear if deadzone12==0 
& t!=3 & t!=4 & t!=5 & yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & first_year!=1 & 
t!=0 & PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
 
M11 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled depth_x_post_all 
Restorative_p negativeDV_Learn123_post positiveDV_Learn123_post 
sc_post_netcitations sc_post_warning Log_YSD i.citingyear if t!=0 & 
yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & first_year!=1 & t!=0 & PrePostData==1, 
fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
 
M12 
xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled depth_x_post_all 
Restorative_p negativeDV_Learn123_post positiveDV_Learn123_post 
sc_post_netcitations sc_post_warning Log_YSD if deadzone12==0 & 
yearsbetween!=0 & mean_pre_z > 3 & first_year!=1 & t < 4 & t > -2 & t!=0 & 
PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
test post_override = post_overruled 
 
M13  
xtreg NLogCitations post post_override post_overruled depth_x_post_all 
Restorative_p negativeDV_Learn123_post positiveDV_Learn123_post 
sc_post_netcitations sc_post_warning unified_control Fed_id_aligned_Over_p 
liberal_case_post Log_YSD i.citingyear if deadzone12==0 & yearsbetween!=0 
& mean_pre_z > 3 & first_year!=1 & t!=0 & PrePostData==1, fe vce(robust) 
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